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ABSTRACT
Climate change presents a wicked problem for coastal planners and policy
makers (Lazarus, 2008) that transcends political boundaries and involves complex
social and infrastructure networks (R. Biesbroek, Termeer, Kabat, & Klostermann,
2009). Traditional ways of thinking, problem solving, and policy making must be
transformed (R. Biesbroek et al., 2009). Leadership is acknowledged as critical to
solving complex problems (G. R. Biesbroek, Klostermann, Termeer, & Kabat, 2013;
Eisenack et al., 2014; Meijerink & Stiller, 2013; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Complex
infrastructure and social systems will need to undergo “transformational adaptation”
in response to rising seas and stronger storms (Kates, Travis, & Wilbanks, 2012).
Many stakeholders across various jurisdictional boundaries and at all levels of
government will need to play a role (Kates et al., 2012). This research explores the
port of Providence community’s perceptions around the responsibility to lead in
resilience planning and systemic transformational change, specifically evaluating
gaps between stakeholders and those expected to lead the change. We found that
stakeholder perceptions of adaptation leadership contribute to an institutional void, in
which it is unclear who is responsible and who pays for resilience investment. This
research emphasizes the need for pre-planning dialogue in the face of wicked
problems in order to develop consensus for resilience investment strategies. Preplanning allows clarification of stakeholder roles and politically, economically, and
socially feasible resilience options can be identified.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Climate change presents a wicked problem for coastal planners and policy makers
(Lazarus, 2008) that transcends political boundaries and involves complex social and
infrastructure networks (Biesbroek, Termeer, Kabat, & Klostermann, 2009). Traditional
ways of thinking, problem solving, and policy making must be transformed (Biesbroek et
al., 2009). Leadership is acknowledged as critical to solving complex problems
(Biesbroek, Klostermann, Termeer, & Kabat, 2013; Eisenack et al., 2014; Meijerink &
Stiller, 2013; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Complex infrastructure and social systems will
need to undergo “transformational adaptation” in response to rising seas and stronger
storms (Kates et al., 2012). Many stakeholders across various jurisdictional boundaries
and at all levels of government will need to play a role (Kates et al., 2012). This research
explores one seaport community’s perceptions around the responsibility to lead in
resilience planning and systemic transformational change, specifically evaluating gaps
between stakeholders and those expected to lead the change.
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2. Literature Review and Background
2.1 Background
Seaports comprise complex coastally located systems inherently vulnerable to
climate impacts (Becker et al., 2013; Bender et al., 2010; Emanuel, 2013; Tebaldi,
Strauss, & Zervas, 2012). Sea level rise and surge flooding associated with climate
change intensified tropical storms present a complex problem to seaports. Though
resilience planning has become more prevalent globally, few resilience measures have
been implemented in the U.S. (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, 2011), or in the world’s ports
(Becker, Inoue, Fischer, & Schwegler, 2012).
The planning process can be hindered by a wide variety of barriers defined as
“obstacles that can be overcome with concerted effort, creative management change of
thinking, prioritization, and related shifts in resources, land uses, institutions, etc.”
(Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, p. 22027). Effective leadership can help break down some of
these barriers (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). Planners and policy makers need better
information on how barriers are formed including causes (Biesbroek et al., 2013) and
entry points (Eisenack et al., 2014), including research directed at understanding how
insufficient leadership influences barriers.
Using the business and regulatory stakeholder group at the Port of Providence in
Providence, R.I., we asked port stakeholders who they felt had a responsibility to lead in
resilience planning and implementation. Then using an evaluative framework, we asked
the leaders to react to stakeholder perceptions as well as evaluate their leadership role.
The purpose of this study was to examine whether or not gaps exist between business
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stakeholder and regulatory stakeholder perceptions of leadership responsibility and how
such gaps might contribute to resilience barriers.
Climate change, resulting sea level rise and increased tropical storm
activity pose a significant threat to seaports. By 2100, scientists project a doubling in the
frequency of category four and five hurricanes (Bender et al., 2010), as well as increases
in wind and surge produced by these storms (Emanuel, 2013; Tebaldi et al., 2012). Ports
by their nature are located at the interface between land and sea, leaving them inherently
vulnerable to sea level rise and storm impacts (Becker, Matson, Fischer, & Mastrandrea,
2014). This presents a “wicked problem” that transcends traditional problem solving and
policy processes because they involve multiple stakeholders across multiple jurisdictions
at all governmental levels (Biesbroek et al., 2009) The cost of problem solving is felt
early, but benefits are often not seen until far in the future. Wicked problems require
changes in thinking and changes in problem solving processes (Lazarus, 2008).
Future major storm events, on the scale of Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm
Sandy, are likely to impair port operations and have a major impact on U.S. economies at
all scales, local to global (Becker et al., 2014; Neumann et al., 2014; Nicholls &
Cazenave, 2010). Extreme weather events such as hurricanes result in multiple direct,
indirect, and intangible consequences (Becker et al., 2014). These include damages to
port facilities, equipment, and buildings; loss of business for port tenants; cost of cleanup
and emergency response; loss of jobs; environmental damages; and impacts to quality of
life (A. Becker et al., 2014). The Port of Providences has a history of close calls as well
as two near direct landfalls (Appendix 1, Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency,
2014).
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Hurricane impacts reach beyond the port area to regional economies through
supply chain disruptions (A. Becker et al., 2012, 2014; Hallegatte, 2008; Koetse &
Rietveld, 2009). Economic impacts of port activity reach far beyond the port. In 2011,
U.S. ports handled 53% of U.S. imports and 38% of U.S. exports by value via 62,000
vessel calls (Chambers & Liu, 2013). In 2014, the U.S. port system supported over 23
million jobs (direct, indirect, and induced); approximately $4.6 trillion in total economic
value, and approximately $3.2 billion in tax revenue (American Assocaition of Port
Authorities, 2015). Port closures, shipment delays, and other impacts as a consequence of
hurricane damage have the potential to displace and reduce ports economic benefit
(Hallegatte, 2008).
As part of resilient intermodal transportation systems, resilient ports provide
economic benefit to regions and nations (Southworth, Hayes, McLeod, & StraussWieder, 2014). They also provide researchers a defined space to study gaps in
stakeholder perception of leadership in the face of wicked problems, because port
systems include multiple stakeholders across various levels of government and
jurisdiction (Becker et al., 2014; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997 Notteboom &
Winklemans, 2002; Stewart, 2014; Winklemans & Notteboom, 2007). Previous work
used stakeholder-based methods to identify possible resilience strategies within seaport
systems. Becker and Caldwell (2015) focused specifically on identifying possible
resilience strategies within the port communities of Gulfport, Miss. and Providence, R.I.
Understanding a suite of options is important to improving resilience, but it is a long path
from understanding options to implementation of resilience strategies.
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The Rockefeller Foundation 100 Resilient Cities Program defines resilience as
“the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a
city to survive adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks
they experience” (The Rockerfeller Foundation, 2015, p. 2). The Foundation also
highlights leadership and strategy, in which successful leadership “promotes leadership
and effective management, empowers a broad range of stakeholders, and fosters longterm and integrated planning (The Rockefeller Foundation, 2015, p. 2)”.
“Transformational adaptation” such as the construction of flood barriers, the elevation of
entire seaports, or the relocation of infrastructure to less vulnerable locations are complex
resilience strategies; effective management through strong leadership and strategy is need
to promote long-term and holistic planning efforts.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Adaptation Leadership
Adaptation leaders are defined here as “those that will implement climate
resilience strategies in complex systems such as ports”. From the literature, adaptation
leaders are individuals, an organization, or a group of organizations that help complete
the resilience implementation process by facilitating functions within a group of
stakeholders (Meijerink & Stiller, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, 2011; Stiller &
Meijerink, 2015). The functions include but are not limited to setting deadlines, sourcing
and allocating resources, disseminating information, and connecting stakeholders.
Adaptation leaders also display certain behaviors that build trust and encourage
stakeholder participation (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990). These
behaviors include but are not limited to acting as a role model, encouraging out of the
5

box thinking and intellectual thought, and providing one-on-one support to stakeholders.
These actions and behaviors reduce the impact of barriers to adaptation (Moser &
Ekstrom, 2010). In this section we better define adaptation leadership.
Rarely does any singular agent have the absolute power to make major
transformational change to a complex system like a seaport (Kates et al., 2012).
Leadership is more likely to emerge from certain stakeholders that motivate and sustain
the participation of other stakeholders (Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). A collective leadership
is considered important for navigating around policy barriers, and it can help overcome
barriers when a lack of mandates, resources, information, and authorization exist
(Biesbroek et al., 2009; Karlsson, Parker, Hjerpe, & Linnér, 2011; Meijerink & Stiller,
2013, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Adaption leadership can
also help develop consensus around decisions in which many stakeholders are presented
with multiple resilience options (Becker, 2016; Biesbroek et al., 2013; Karlsson et al.,
2011; Vogel, Moser, Kasperson, & Dabelko, 2007).
Stiller and Meijerink (2015) describe five functions of leadership: politicaladministrative function, an enabling function, an adaptive function, a dissemination
function and a connective function. In this study, we use these functions as a guide to help
stakeholder-identified leaders assess and report on their own leadership responsibility
(Section 3.3). Since adaptation leaders are expected to bring about transformational
change we can expect that they might have transformational leadership qualities.
Transformational leaders often display the ability to articulate a vision, provide a model
of behavior, promote cooperation among members of a group, expect high performance
of community members, and provide individual support and intellectual stimulation.
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These behaviors enhance trust between leaders and stakeholders, increasing participation
and leading to more favorable change (Podsakoff et al., 1990). For more information on
adaptation leadership see Appendix 3.
Past studies have examined which organizations are responsible for leading
adaption for large systems such as ports. Becker and Caldwell (2015) suggest that state
and local authorities are largely responsible for planning and implementing adaptation
strategies and that Long-range planning (like transformational adaptation) is best fit
under state purview (Becker & Caldwell, 2015). Our study investigates who at the Port of
Providence is perceived as responsible to lead such long-range resilience and adaptation
planning activities.
2.2.2 Barriers relation to leadership
Researchers have identified many barriers to resilience planning created by
leadership including intuitional void, fragmentation, and insufficient leadership
(Biesbroek et al. (2009), Moser & Ekstrom (2010), Stiller & Meijerink (2015)). An
institutional void is when “there is no clear division of who decides” or “who is
responsible” (Biesbroek et al., 2009, 7). Institutional void does not just mean there is no
decision maker, it can be seen when there is a lack of decision making structure or when
the mechanisms and processes of decision making do not exist (Biesbroek et al., 2009).
Such a void can happen when decision makers are presented with new, un-before-seen
challenges, such as the results of climate change.
Fragmentation, a barrier similar to institutional void, occurs when there are
multiple stakeholders able to act to make change to a system, but no one party takes the
lead or there are multiple disjointed efforts (Biesbroek et al., 2009; Moser & Ekstrom,
7

2010). For example, the Port of Providence is made up of multiple business owners and
each owner has some flexibility to alter their existing property. They also have the choice
to support and participate, or oppose and obstruct other actions or planning processes.
Fragmentation occurs when it is not clear who should be making decision and who
should be acting to make change.
Leadership can be a cross-cutting issue, meaning it has the potential to both break
down and to create barriers throughout the policy process (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010).
Barriers caused by insufficient leadership and the lack of a decision-making structure
benefit from increased dialogue (Douglas et al., 2011). Dialogue throughout various
stages of the resilience process motivate leadership by instilling ownership, expectation,
and accountability (Moser & Ekstrom, 2011). Dialogue through early engagement
increases trust and motivates participation in the planning process (Douglas et al., 2011)
by elevating the stature of the resilience process and those involved (Moser & Ekstrom,
2011). An example of this dialogue is pre-planning. Pre-planning is a process the engages
stakeholders in problem solving before any management decisions are made (Becker, In
press). These process are often facilitated by boundary-spanning organizations (Preston,
Rickards, Dessai, & Meyer, 2013; Tribbia & Moser, 2008).
Boundary-spanning organizations or individuals co-exist with decision-making
organizations, but do not have any formal decision-making authority (Tribbia & Moser,
2008). Universities and research institutes are examples. These organizations transcend
jurisdictions and act as translators between different stakeholder groups (Tribbia &
Moser, 2008; Vogel et al., 2007). Pre-planning brings together different stakeholder
groups, translates information between stakeholder groups, facilitate collaboration, and
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provide mediation services (Tribbia & Moser, 2008). Pre-planning processes allow for
dialogue around un-before-discussed risks, the political, economic, and social feasibility
of resilience options, and roles of stakeholders within the community, without laying
blame or calling out any specific organization (Becker, In Press). We propose that preplanning phases of climate resilience decision-making motivate leaders and allow for a
clarification of leadership roles, which by doing so reduces the impact of barriers in the
resilience process (Moser & Ekstrom, 2011) Pre-planning dialogue can also motivate the
participation of those responsible to lead (Douglas et al., 2011; Moser & Ekstrom, 2011).
Barriers are likely to be seen in port stakeholder networks in the face of complex
and never-before-seen challenges. This study examines how stakeholders perceive
leadership responsibility. It then proposes strategies to break down barriers to effective
planning for resilience. It does so by addressing three research questions through
interviews and surveys of stakeholders of the Port of Providence, Rhode Island.
2.3 Research Questions
1. Are there differences in who public and private stakeholders see as responsible for
leading resilience implementation at the Port of Providence?
2. Are there differences in how stakeholders and who stakeholders perceive as
responsible to lead resilience implementation see the responsibility to lead
resilience implementation at the Port of Providence?
3. What barriers do leaders see as inhibiting their leadership role for climate
resilience in the Port of Providence?
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3. Methods
In order to compare perceptions of leadership responsibility, we undertook a twopart study. We first engaged Port of Providence business and government stakeholders in
a survey that asked respondents to identify the organizations they saw as responsible for
the planning and implementation of three long-term transformational strategies. We also
asked respondents to assign responsibility to seven forms of leadership (Section 3.1)
leadership, as follows: independent businesses, businesses in collaboration with each
other, informal public-private collaboration, formal public-private collaboration, local
(Providence and East Providence), state (Rhode Island), and federal lead. We used this
information to identify organizations perceived to be responsible for resilience
implementation.
We then interviewed high-level managers from these respondent-identified leader
organizations. We asked the managers to evaluate their organizations responsibility to
facilitate leadership functions in implementing resilience strategies at the Port of
Providence. We did this by using a framework, which describes the role of leadership in
the implementation process. This framework is described in in Section 3.3.
Throughout this paper “stakeholders” refers to the port of Providence stakeholder
community, “participant” refers to those that participated in the Port of Providence
workshop, “respondent” refers to those that responded to the Part 1 survey, and
“interviewee” or “manager” refers to those interviewed in Part 2 and represent
organizations perceived as responsible to lead.

Study Area
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The Port of Providence is located south of downtown Providence at the mouth of
Providence River and head of Narragansett Bay (Figure 1). The study area encompasses
waterfront industrial business on both the Providence and East Providence side of the
river.

Providence

East Providence

Figure – The study area represented by the red boundary, includes Interstate-195, business along Allen’s Avenue and
Shipyard Road. Save the Bay and two water terminals in East Providence.

11

The port is critical to RI economy and the Rhode Island, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts region (Providence Working Waterfront Association, 2008; ProvPort,
2015; U.S. Energy Information Administration, n.d.) and is located in an exposed
location to climate impacts including sea level rise and storm surge from hurricanes
(Rubinoff, 2007). The governance structure of the port is complex, notably there is no
operating port authority (Becker et al., 2014). Overlapping local and state zoning laws
and regulations govern the port and approximately 30 independent businesses operate
within the study area.
Stakeholders from the Port of Providence participated in previous planning and
research efforts, of which this project forms a part. In August of 2015, 30 port
stakeholders participated in a hurricane resilience workshop (from this point referred to
as “the workshop”) that used tools and visualizations to introduce stakeholders to
hurricane vulnerability and possible resilience strategies. The workshop initiated a
dialogue within the port community. Using storm visualizations, stakeholders assessed
impacts to the port in the weeks, months, and years following the storm scenario. We
presented participants with three potential resilience concepts called Protect, Relocate,
and Accommodate, which are explained in detail in Appendix 2B.
Workshop results concluded that participants were aware of the climate change
risks their business face, however, there was no consensus on who is responsible for
implementation of resilience strategies and who would pay for them in what time frame.
Participants did evaluate resilience strategies and found that protecting the port (with
some sort of barrier) best met their goals. There was also resistance to relocating port
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infrastructure to less vulnerable locations, indicting that strategy is less feasible. For
additional information on the study area see Appendix 2.
3.1 Part I – Survey of Port Stakeholders

In order to understand which organizations port stakeholders perceive as
responsible for adaptation leadership, we engaged 31 port stakeholders representing both
the business and regulatory community around the Port of Providence. Twenty-six
stakeholders responded to our survey and 25 completed the survey in full, 13 represented
a business or non-government organization and 12 represented government. Of those who
responded, nine reported operating facilities within the study area and 14 were interested
in port operations for economic, regulatory, emergency response, or planning reasons.
We asked the respondents a series of questions on the three long-term resilience
strategies presented to them in the workshop, which are Protect, Relocate, and
Accommodate (Appendix 4A). These represent three broad archetypal strategies that
could be implemented at the port, as follows:
Protect – This concept “protects” the port using large-scale infrastructure like a
storm barrier located seaward of the port. This concept requires the construction of a
barrier that would protect from some community-identified surge height. This concept,
unless including a lock system, does not accommodate for impacts from sea level rise as
this rise is passive, and the barrier will remain open to allow for navigation of commerce.
Relocate – This concept moves some infrastructure out of locations deemed
vulnerable by the community during the planning. Examples of infrastructure that could
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be moved are chemical storage facilities (e.g., oil tanks), office space, and equipment
storage facilities. This would require the purchase of off-port locations.
Accommodate – This concept invests in improvements to port infrastructure in
order to better withstand storm surge related impacts. Examples include elevating
properties, elevating utilities and structures, utilizing floodable spaces and break through
walls, and waterproofing structures. This strategy has the potential to accommodate for
sea level rise, though this was not discussed in detail during the workshop. For additional
information on the resilience concepts see Appendix 2B.
Table 1 – We used the Forms of Leadership to evaluate which type of organization is responsible for the
implementation of resilience at the Port of Providence.

Form of leadership

Description

Businesses independently

Private businesses independently have sole responsibility for the
implementation of resilience.
Private businesses collaborate to improve resilience collectively with
no/little government support.
Business and government working cooperatively to improve
resilience. An example of this is a Special Area Management Plan
process.
Public and private organizations work cooperatively in a Rhode
Island legislature authorized/mandated body. An example of this is
the Governor’s Commission of Dredging, formed by governor
Lincoln Almond in 1996 (ESNR, 2008)
City governments take a lead role in facilitating implementation of
resilience in the study area.
The state of Rhode Island takes a lead role in facilitating
implementation of resilience in the study area.
The U.S. federal government takes a lead role in facilitating
implementation of resilience in the study area.

Business in collaboration
Public-private informal
collaboration
Public-private formal
collaboration
Local lead (City of Providence
and East Providence)
State lead (Rhode Island)
Federal lead (United States)

To investigate which organizations stakeholders perceive as responsible for
implementing resilience strategies within the study area, we presented respondents with
seven possible “leadership forms,” as follows, port business independently; port business
in collaboration; public-private informal collaboration; public-private formal
collaboration (i.e. special committee on port resilience); and local; state; and federal
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lead. We developed these using the definition of leadership provided in Stiller and
Meijerink (2015) and personal communications with policy experts (Fugate, 2016;
Robadue, 2016).
We asked respondents to assign the responsibility of these leadership forms to
implement each of the resilience concepts (Protect, Relocate, and Accommodate).
Stakeholders answered on a 1 – 5 scale: (1) not responsible at all, (2) less responsible
than others, (3) just as responsible as others, (4) more responsible than others, and (5)
entirely responsible. These scores were averaged to indicate how the group as a whole
perceived the responsibility of each leadership form.
For each resilience strategy, we asked respondents which entities (person,
organization, agency, business, etc.) they see as responsible for implementing resilience
and tabulated the number of mentions each entity received as well as created word clouds
using the online application Wordle.
3.2 Part II – Interview of stakeholder perceived leaders
In Part 1 of the study, respondents identified nine entities as leaders in our openended questions, as follows: the city governments of Providence and East Providence, the
Rhode Island Department of Transportation, the Department of Environmental
Management, the Coastal Resources Council, Statewide Planning (part of the RI
Department of Administration), CommerceRI, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and an
organization that represents the Port of Providence business community. In part 2 of the
study, we interviewed seven of the nine high-level managers of the entities identified in
part 1, while two declined to be interviewed (Appendix 4C).
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These managers are referred to as “interviewees” in the next sections; it is
important to note, that respondents identified the organizations, while we identified a
high-level manager that represents each organization. We asked organization managers to
react to the word clouds created during Part 1 of the study (Figure 5). In the interviews,
respondents discussed whether or not they perceived their organization to be in a
leadership role for storm resilience. After recording initial reactions, we asked the
interview subjects to evaluate their organizations responsibility to using the framework
provided in Section 3.3. To follow up, we asked respondents what barriers they see that
prevents their organization from moving forward in resilience implementation. In order to
analyze interview transcripts we adapted a conceptual framework that describes the roles
of leadership throughout the resilience policy process. For more information on interview
analysis see Appendix 4D.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
In order to structure interview analysis, we adapted a framework (Stiller &
Meijerink, 2015), through which we could evaluate each organization’s responsibility
throughout the resilience planning and implementation process. To do this we combined
a simple model of the policy process made up of three major steps, understanding,
planning, and managing and the conceptual leadership functions framework in Stiller and
Meijerink (2015) (Figure 2).
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Figure 1 – Leadership functions throughout the Policy Process - The Political Administrative Function, Enabling
Function Adaptive Function, Dissemination Function, and Connective Function are facilitated by leadership
throughout the policy process (understanding, planning, and managing).

As described by Moser and Ekstrom (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010), understanding
includes identifying problems and measuring their potential impact on a system. Planning
involves identifying potential resilience options, assessing the feasibility, costs, and
benefits, and selecting the optimal option. And managing entails installing, monitoring,
and evaluating the selected resilience option. In this paper, we discuss “implementation”
as a combination of the three phases of the policy process.
Throughout the resilience planning process, leaders provide five functions that
help facilitate the policy process and deliver the process from one stage to the next
(Stiller & Meijerink, 2015), as follows:
1. Political-administrative function – consists of “every day” actions taken to
facilitate the management of the policy process such as making decisions on
strategy options and designating funding sources for selected strategies.
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2. Enabling function – motivates progress by instilling a sense of urgency, though
initiating discussions and setting deadlines.
3. Adaptive function – creates new ideas and process, as well as solutions to exposed
barriers. This function allows the organization to change structurally to meet
external changes and forces.
4. Dissemination function – provides information on new ideas, problems, and
solutions to resilience partners and collects information from partners and
incorporates them into decision-making.
5. Connective Function – incorporates stakeholders into a collective group. It
provides connections between stakeholders by initiating meetings and work
sessions and by engaging new stakeholders.

We used this framework to evaluate how high-level managers perceived their
organization’s leadership role both temporally (or throughout the resilience planning
process) and functionally (in the facilitation of leadership functions). For additional
information on adaptation leadership see Appendix 3, for more information on methods
see appendix 4..
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4. Results
4.1 Survey respondents see a collaborative effort as necessary for implementing
resilience strategies
Results from Part 1 of the study address Research Question 1. Survey
respondents identified their initial opinions about what form of leadership is responsible
for the implementation of resilience. Results indicated that they perceive a public-private
informal collaboration as the optimal choice to lead resilience implementation, though
they also supported a state lead effort (Figure 3). In this part, we averaged the 1-5 scaling
described in our methods. A score of 1, the lowest possible score, indicated that the
stakeholder group did not see that organization as responsible. A score of 5, the highest
possible score, indicates complete responsibility. Three, being the mid-point, indicated
that scales were neutral on the leadership structures responsibility to lead.
Respondents felt that a public-private informal collaboration is most responsible
to implement resilience with the average of responses evaluating it as more responsible to
entirely responsible (this is represented as a score of greater than four, Figure 3). State
led leadership also scored highly and is the second choice for leadership by the
stakeholders (Figure 3). On the other hand, respondents do not see private business
independently or private businesses in collaboration as responsible to implement
resilience strategies. Average scores lower than three, shown in Figure 3, indicate this.
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5

Organiza:ons with Responsibility to Implement Port of Providence
Resilience Measures
According to Respondents (n=25)

4

3

2

1

Private Business
Independently

Private
Businesses in
Collabora:on

Public-Private
Informal
Collabora:on

Public-Private
Local Lead
State Lead
Formal
(Providence; East (Rhode Island)
Collabora:on
Providence)

All Stakeholder

Public

Federal Lead

Private

Figure 2 – Public-private informal collaboration received an average score of greater than four; the only other form of
leadership above four is state lead. A score of one indicates “not responsible at all”, two indicates “less responsible”,
three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates “more responsible than others”, and five indicates
“entirely responsible”..

4.2 Stakeholders from different sectors (public vs. private) have different ideas about
which organization should be responsible for leading resilience actions
Though stakeholders collectively see a collaborative effort as responsible there
were disagreements between public and private stakeholders when presented with
different resilience strategy options. For example, private sector respondents hold
different opinions than public sector respondents when it comes to identifying
responsibility for the accommodate strategy (Figure 4). Business respondents tend to see
government-centric leadership structures as more responsible than business-centric
leaderships structures. This is indicated by scores greater than three (meaning tending to
be more responsible) for local, state, and federal lead.
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On the other hand, respondents representing public organizations tend to see
business-centric leadership structures as more responsible, as indicate by scores greater
than three for private businesses independently and private business in collaboration.
This is an example in which private respondents see public leadership structures as
responsible for resilience implementation, whereas government respondents see private
leadership structures as responsible. It is important to note; however, that the highest
average score is for both public-private informal collaboration and state lead.
These findings align with the work of Karlesson et al. (2011), who observed that
geographic location; stakeholder’s roles and characteristics; and the options in question
presented to stakeholders, influenced how stakeholders perceived responsibility of
climate negotiation (Karlsson et al., 2011). In the case of the Port of Providence, we see
that respondents perceive the responsibility of leading resilience action differently, this is
likely based on various factors, including whether or not their organization is located
within the study area, who they represent (public or private organization), and which
resilience strategy they are presented with.
Next, we explored how respondents perceive responsibility for implementing each
of the three resilience concepts individually. We were interested in seeing whether or not
resilience strategy would affect who respondents see as responsible to implement
resilience.
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Organiza:ons with Responsibility to
Implement Accommodate at the Port of Providence
According to Respondents (n=25)
5

Average Score

4

3

2

1

Private Business
Private
Independently Businesses in
Collabora:on

Public-Private
Informal
Collabora:on

All Stakeholders

Public-Private
Local Lead
State Lead
Formal
(Providence; (Rhode Island)
Collabora:on East Providence)

Form of Leadership
Public

Federal Lead

Private

Figure 3 – Public stakeholders tend to see private-centric leadership structures as responsible, while private
stakeholders tend to see public-centric stakeholders as responsible. A score of one indicates “not responsible at all”,
two indicates “less responsible”, three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates “more responsible than
others”, and five indicates “entirely responsible”.

Open-ended questions asking stakeholders who is responsible for leading the
implementation of accommodate, relocate, and protect, showed that stakeholders
perceive 36 different organizations as responsible (Figure 5).
Overall stakeholders listed numerous organizations as having responsibility for
the various strategy options (Figure 5). When comparing implementation responsibility
for accommodate, relocate, and protect we see that respondents felt that “Businesses”,
along with the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, should be
responsible for implementing accommodate strategies. They felt that the City
Governments and CommerceRI should be responsible for implementing relocate
strategies. Finally, they felt that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the State of
Rhode Island responsible for implementing protect strategies.
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Figure 4 – Different organizations were identified as responsible for each resilience strategy:
a.) # of Unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 21; Total Mentions - 46; RI Government (8),

Federal Government (6), USACE (6), RICRMC (4), RIDEM (4), City Government (3), Public (2), RI
Statewide Planning (1), Collaboration (1), URI (1), CommerceRI (1), ProvPort (1), City Planning (1), Save
the Bay (1), FEMA (1), Private (1), Mass Government (1), RIDOT (1), Business (1), URICRC (1); n = 25.
b.) # of unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 21; Total mentions - 49; City Government (8),
CommerceRI (5), Business (4), RICRMC (4), None (no organization) (4), Rhode Island Statewide Planning
(3), Federal Government (3), RIDEM (3), RIDOT (2), ProvPort (2), RI Government (2), Collaboration (1),
Courts (1), Public (1), URI (1), Save the Bay (1), City Planning (1), Government (1), Port of Providence
(1), Public-Private Formal Committee * (1), USACE (1);n = 25.
c.) # of unique orgs - 24; Total Votes - 45; Business (5), RIDEM (5), Collaboration* (4), RICRMC (4), City
Government (3), RI Statewide Planning (2), EPA (2), USACE (2), FEMA (2), Providence Working
Waterfront (1), URI (1), URICRC (1), RIDOT (1), Federal Government (1), None (1), NOAA (1),
Governor’s Office (1), USCG (1), Public (1), Port of Providence (1), Petroleum Industry (1), Special
Committee* (1), Public-Private Committee* (1); n = 25.

It is difficult to define where leadership for resilience implementation rests,
because there are so many stakeholders of the Port of Providence and so many options for
building resilience to climate change. Our results show that 36 different organizations,
spanning public and private; local, state, and federal, are seen by respondents as having
responsibility to lead in resilience implementation. Though some organizations received
more mentions than others, our study provides empirical evidence that there is a lack of
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consensus amongst port stakeholders when it comes to determining which entity should
take a leadership role. This leaves an institutional void when it comes to resilience
implementation. This has led to a situation in which no entity has taken action because no
entity is mandated to take on the problem. For a list of acronyms used in survey analysis
please see Appendix 5.
4.3 Perceived leaders felt they were leaders, but not entirely
Results from interviews in Part 2 of the study addressed Research Question 2.
They show that representatives of six of the seven managers interviewed stated that their
organization is, in fact, a leader in resilience implementation. These representatives
characterized their leadership in two ways: One group perceived their organization as a
leader, but with limits to its ability to implement change at the Port of Providence. The
second group felt that their entity could participate in leadership activities, but not be a
sole “leader.” For example one respondent after stating their leadership role said, “We do
have a direct role. I see us as a direct participant.”
When we asked interviewees to evaluate their role in the resilience
implementation process, we found that no representative felt that their organization
fulfilled all of the five functions of leadership throughout the policy process
(understanding, planning, and managing; Section 3.3). For example two interviewees felt
that their organizations held responsibility for fulfilling the dissemination, adaptation,
and connective functions during the planning phase for climate resilience; however, they
felt that they had no role in the managing phase and that the responsibility for leading
implementation would thus need to be passed to someone else.
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Similarly, another manager felt that, for the protect strategy in particular, their
organization is responsible for the managing phase but not for the planning phase of that
project. This suggests that the resilience strategy we presented interviewees with also
impacted their perception of the organizations responsibility. Another representative
stated that their organization focused on the dissemination of information to help port
businesses understand their risk, this suggests the organization sees themselves as
fulfilling the dissemination function during the understanding phase of the policy
process, but not any other functions and they felt no responsibility in the planning or
managing phase.
Only one representative indicated that their organization held responsibility to
complete all of the leadership functions; however, this organization only indicated it
could complete these functions during the planning phase and was less sure about its role
in the managing phase. The least discussed by managers and least fulfilled functions
where the enabling function and the political and administrative function. These
functions allocate funds as well as motivate and set deadlines for other stakeholders
participating in the process, suggesting that this may inhibit action toward resilience
implementation at the Port of Providence.
These results indicate that no one leader fulfills all the leadership functions
throughout the policy process from understanding to managing. However, it is shown that
each organization plays a role in resilience implementation. This is an example of
fragmentation, a barrier described in Section 2.2.2, because multiple organizations can
influence the process and take the lead. However, who should take the lead is unclear,
because so many organizations are involved. This lack of continual and clear leadership
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results in the fragmentation of responsibility. It is not clear who should be acting at what
phase, or who is responsible for what part of resilience implementation.
4.4 Leaders face barriers that affect their perception of leadership responsibility
To answer Research Question 3 about barriers to leadership, we asked
interviewees what barriers they felt were inhibiting their actions on resilience
implementation. We identified four barriers that inhibited leadership organizations from
taking a leadership role at the Port of Providence; they are 1) expertise, 2) jurisdiction, 3)
lack of resources, and 4) lack of mandates/authorization. These barriers impacted some of
the leaders’ perception of their organizations role in leading the resilience process making
them see their organization as less responsible, because they faced one or more of these
barriers.
4.4.1 Expertise
We found that interviewees did not feel that their organizations had the skills or
expertise to fulfill one or more of the leadership functions necessary to plan and
implement resilience. We asked specifically how they felt their organization could fulfill
each of the five leadership functions for climate resilience described in Section 3.3. For
example, one interviewee felt that their organization could not complete the connective
function because, their organization had no history of bring groups of collaborators
together and did not know who should be involved, stating that, “A limitation is our [lack
of] understanding of all of the players”. The time horizons involved in implementing
climate resilience also factored into interviewee’s perceptions of their organizations
mandate or expertise. Only one organization stated that they could plan or operate within
the 50-100 year into the future time period, in which many of the major impacts of
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climate change are likely to be felt. One leader stated, “Resiliency is not something that is
going to be addressed by one organization” meaning that for this leader, it was going to
take a collaborative effort, with multiple organizations with multiple skill sets, access to
resources, and of different jurisdictions to improve the resilience of the port.
4.4.2 Jurisdiction/scope
Interviewees reported that they felt their organizations were limited by their
jurisdiction and/or their scope, when it came to planning for climate resilience for the
Port of Providence. Some organizations were limited to working within in a unit smaller
than the study area. For example, one leader stated, “Yes we take a lead role within the
City limits, [but not beyond].” This representative said that within their city they had the
ability to take the lead; however, they would need to be part of a larger collaborative
effort if the entire Port of Providence (which includes both the City of Providence and
East Providence) were included in a major planning effort.
Other interviewees felt that planning at the port scale was too small of a unit to
work, stating, “We have taken [a leadership role]… for the entire coastline, including in
Providence Harbor, [but we do not focus specifically on any one location].” Another
organization explained that their long-term resilience planning work was spread
throughout the state, “Yes, [we have] taken a high-level leadership role in Providence
Harbor as well as other locations.” They stated that if port business stakeholders reached
out to them they would be able to input information into the planning process, but they
would not take the initiative to begin a planning process without being approached by an
entity more directly linked to the study area. This interviewee followed up to saying that
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at a lack of resources also limited their participation in planning for climate resilience at
the Port of Providence.
4.4.3 Lack of resources
In fact, a lack of resources turned out to be a recurring theme. Every interviewee
stated that the lack of resources limited their organization’s ability to lead in the
resilience planning and implantation process at the port of Providence. Below are three
examples of interviewee statements about this issue.
“Funding is always an issue, if we don’t have the resources to complete the job correctly
then that is a barrier.”
“Funding, authority, and appropriation barriers, we can’t just go out and do anything we
want”
“Resources are always an issue, [we] are always spread everywhere thin, personnel and
financial.”
The lack of personnel and financial resources heavily impacted how leaders
perceived their organization’s role at the port. All managers of perceived leader
organizations expressed the need for more money and more personnel if their
organization was going to take a lead role in climate adaptation for the Port of
Providence. One manager expressed the importance of a resilience grant process as a way
to provide resources, suggesting that grants incentivize the participation of businesses,
government, and non-governmental organizations (including universities).
4.4.4 Lack of mandates/authorization
Interviewees discussed how they often rely on the actions of others before acting
themselves and that the resilience planning process needs a catalyst to begin. Two
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interviewees, one state (Rhode Island) and one federal, stated that though their
involvement was within their jurisdiction a lack of authorization from legislative
organizations inhibited their leadership at the Port of Providence. An interviewee stated,
“…If we are going to impose change… it would take specific authority to require that.”
Other interviewees stated that though not totally in their jurisdiction but if mandated by
law, their organization would be motivated to take a lead role in resilience
implementation at the port, particularly if grant funding was provided to conduct the
work. Another interviewee stated, “Funding, authority, and appropriation barriers, we
can’t just go out and do anything we want.”
4.5 Managers see opportunities to collaborate as motivation and chance to clarify roles
Interviewees explicitly stated the need for dialogue to help motivate their
organization into a leadership role. Along with access to funding, leaders stated,
“opportunities to cooperate”, “a group that was constantly driving discussion”, and “it
is helpful to have things like the workshop to help remind [us of potential risks] and give
ideas.” One interviewee mentioned the Port of Providence workshop conducted prior to
this research as a valuable motivating force. This aligns with other findings in other work
in which dialogue between stakeholders instilled ownership in the process as well as
increased trust and motivated participation (Douglas et al., 2011). Pre-planning
opportunities, like the workshop and the process described in Douglas et al. (2011)
motivate participation.
Interviewees also suggested that pre-planning dialogue helps clarify leader roles.
One interviewee stated that conversation with other Port of Providence stakeholders
allowed them “to see what other people do”. This same interviewee previously
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mentioned that they did not know “all the players”. This suggests that pre-planning
would allow for representatives of leadership organizations to see what other
organizations do so managers can evaluate what roles their organization plays and when
in the process. Pre-planning opportunities provide clarification of the feasible and
stakeholder community supported resilience options (Becker, In press). One interviewee
stated that they did not know how to act because they did not know what resilience
strategy was likely to be implemented. Pre-planning can provide the opportunity for
managers of perceived leadership organizations to interact with a portfolio of plausible
resilience options; this helps clarify their leadership roles and when they need to take
action. For additional results see Appendix 6.
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5. Conclusion
Though representatives of all of the perceived leader organization described
playing a leadership role for the implementation of resilience strategies, no interviewee
felt that their organization was solely responsible for the entire implementation process.
In this case study, we found that port stakeholders represented in a survey identified
seven possible organizations as “responsible for climate resilience implementation.”
However, when managers of the seven organizations were interviewed, none was willing
to assume such a leadership role alone. Interviewees identified multiple barriers that
inhibited their leadership, including misaligned jurisdiction, unclear mandates, a lack of
resources, and a lack of expertise.
We also found that when comparing public and private stakeholders, each group
perceived different members of the community as responsible for resilience
implementation. When we compared perceptions around three different resilience
strategy alternatives, we found that respondents felt that different leaders were
responsible for the implementation of different types of resilience strategies. For
“protecting” the port with the construction of a storm barrier, respondents felt that the
state government should lead. If the port were to implement a “relocate” strategy to try to
move uses out of the floodplain area, then respondents thought that a public - private
collaboration should be formed to implement. Finally, “accommodating” existing uses
should fall on the private sector for investment and implementation.
The sheer number of stakeholders involved in planning for the port, further
contributes to an institutional void and fragmentation of leadership responsibility. Survey
respondents representing port stakeholders mentioned 36 unique organizations with
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responsibility to lead resilience implementation. This contributes to institutional void
because it is unclear who should be leading or who should be deciding. There is also no
formal decision making process. Results showed that though all organizations
interviewed play a role it is unclear who plays what role and when. This contributes to
fragmentation of leadership responsibility.
Our results provide evidence of the importance of informal pre-planning dialogue
in order to motivate and clarify leadership roles. Interviewees specifically discussed the
Port of Providence workshop (a pre-planning exercise) as a motivating factor to their
participation, stating that future collaborative opportunities would motivate their
participation. Pre-planning dialogue allows for ownership to be taken (Moser & Ekstrom,
2011), cultivates trust and participation (Douglas et al., 2011), and as our results suggest
allow for those perceived responsible to lead to “see what other people do”. This helps
clarify the many roles (or functions) that perceived leader organizations must take. Preplanning processes allow for discussion of politically, economically, and socially feasible
resilience options (Becker, In press), this discussion allows for further clarification of
leadership roles.
Dialogue held during pre-planning processes can reduce the impact of and help
navigate around barriers (Douglas et al., 2011), because it allows for the transaction of
information from one organization to another (Tribbia & Moser, 2008). Even though
this type of exercise requires funding and prioritization by multiple stakeholders in the
community, future dialogue, however, is critical so that roles may be clarified,
alternatives agreed upon, and responsibility for action may be taken.
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Appendix 1: Appendix Introduction
The appendixes below describe in greater detail aspects of this thesis. They
provide greater detail on the Port of Providence and the Port of Providence Stakeholder
Workshop, the storm scenario and resilience strategies used during the workshop, a
literature review on the definition of adaptation leadership, addition methods, and
additional results that were obtained. We also provide a copy of the survey and copy of
the interview script.

Appendix 2: Port of Providence
This appendix provides more information on the Port of Providence as well as the
Port of Providence stakeholder workshop that took place in August of 2015. A team of
URI researchers that include Austin Becker, Richard Burroughs, Duncan McIntosh, and
Eric Kretsch conducted this workshop. This project was a Rhode Island Department of
Transportation, URI Transportation Center, and Federal Highway Administration funded
grant.. Appendix 2A provides more background on the Port of Providence and it’s
importance to the regional economy. Appendix 2B provides more detail on the Port of
Providence stakeholder workshop. It also provides more information on the storm
scenario and resilience strategies presented to workshop discussed in this thesis.
Appendix 2A: Port of Providence Background
(Authors: Eric Kretsch, Austin Becker, Richard Burroughs, and Duncan McIntosh)
The study area for this project includes ProvPort, the main port terminal, and 23
other waterfront businesses and industries, which together, take up nearly 573 acres of
waterfront in Providence and East Providence (Becker et al., 2010). ProvPort itself sits on
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nearly 105 acres of land that are owned by the City of Providence and operated by a five
board member nonprofit organization, which contracts the services of Waterson
Terminals LLC to operate and maintain the Port. ProvPort generated more than $200
million in economic benefits for the region and over 2,400 jobs were attributed to port
activities in 2009 (Providence Working Waterfront Association, 2010).
The Port is located at the northern end of Narragansett Bay, an ecologically
sensitive estuary that provides breeding grounds for marine life in the region. The length
and orientation of Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay, and its proximity to the Atlantic
hurricane zone, make it susceptible to extreme storm surges from the southerly winds that
are generated when a hurricane passes to the west of the Bay. As such, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) considers Providence to be the “Achilles heel
of the Northeast” (Rubinoff, 2007). The most recent major storm, Hurricane Carol in
1954, produced 14.5 feet of storm surge in Providence. Most of the port lands in the
study area are 3-10 feet above mean high water. A 25 foot hurricane barrier north of the
port protects the downtown Providence area, but could result in higher storm-surge levels
just south of the barrier at the port, as surge waters would accumulate in Providence
Harbor instead of spreading throughout the low-lying region now protected inland of the
barrier.
Appendix 2B: Port of Providence Workshop (Hurricane Scenario and Resilience
Concepts)
(Authors: Eric Kretsch, Austin Becker, Richard Burroughs, and Duncan McIntosh)
In August of 2015, the Port of Providence business and government stakeholder
group participated in a half-day workshop to discuss port vulnerabilities and also discuss
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potential long-term transformation resilience concepts that could be employed within the
port. Since 1851, 37 hurricanes have passed within 50 miles of Rhode Island (Rhode
Island Emergency Management Agency, 2014), which corresponds to a 22.8 % chance of
a hurricane approaching Rhode Island in a given year. In the past 100 years, Providence
suffered two near-direct hit, from the unnamed Hurricane of 1938 and Hurricane Carol in
1954.
During the Port of Providence stakeholder workshop, researchers from the
University Of Rhode Island Department Of Marine Affairs presented workshop
participants with a storm scenario and visualizations to enhance dialogue between
participants. We developed a scenario using input from a project steering committee. We
identified a worst-case category three hurricane, using Sea, Lake, Overland Surges from
Hurricane modeling (SLOSH) to identify potential surge heights. In this scenario the
storm hit at high tide and caused a 21ft surge, just below the design height of the Fox
Point Hurricane Barrier located north of the Port of Providence (Figure 13). We presented
storm scenario images and images of the resilience strategies to promote dialogue
between workshop participants
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Figure 5 - Image of hurricane storm scenario; this image depicts ProvPort proper (Image: Duncan McIntosh).

Figure 6 - Image of hurricane storm scenario; this image depicts Motiva Enterprise's tank farm, west of Allen's
Ave (Image: Duncan McIntosh)
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Figure 7 - Surge generated by hurricane storm scenario. Based on RIGIS, 2013 DEM derived from a 1-meter
resolution digital elevation mode originally produced as a part of the Northeast LIDAR Project in 2011 (Image:
Duncan McIntosh)
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During the workshop, we also presented port stakeholders with concepts that
represent three different long-term transformation resilience concepts to increase port
resilience. These are hypothetical concepts; a mixture these strategies would likely be
necessary to build resilience at the port of Providence.

Figure 8 - Examples of Accommodate; Top Left: raised utilities (Courtesy of PNYNJ); Top Right: port
terminal elevation (Courtesy Port of Gulfport Elevation Plan); Bottom Left: Flood proof utility box (Pt.
Judith, RI), Bottom Right; Breakaway walls (RIEMA)

Accommodate
The “Accommodate” (Figure 8) concept proposed a suite of strategies that allow
businesses to remain in place, but enhance resilience through upgrading, hardening,
elevating and flood-proofing infrastructure and buildings (see e.g., (MassPort, 2014) .
Properties would be retrofitted to withstand significant flooding, while retaining existing
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uses that could be operational upon receding of the flood. Through smart planning and
improved practices, debris impacts could also be limited, decreasing physical and
environmental damage. The “Accommodate” concept proposed a major investment on a
property-by-property basis. Options that were discussed included:
•

Elevating buildings

•

Constructing breakaway walls

•

Flood-proofing utilities

•

Creating floodable first floors

•

Elevating land under structures

•

Elevating critical utilities (e.g., power, water, sewer)

•

Raising backup generators, air conditioning units and oil or gas tanks above the
base flood elevation or onto roof of building

•

Flood-proofing building foundations

•

Using flood/salt water tolerant construction materials

•

Sealing around utility entry points

•

Installing waterproof bulkheads

•

Installing pumps with backup generators to pump out access water

•

Reinforcing windows and doors

•

Covering piles of material with debris tarps and strapping

•

Constructing storm water retention ponds
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Protect

Figure 9 - Example of Protect; a hypothetical Field's Point Hurricane barrier south of the Port of
Providence (Image: URI Landscape Architecture 444 Fall 2014).

The “Protect” concept (Figure 9) reduces storm risk by decreasing the probability
of occurrence of impacts (Tol et al., 2008). To do so, it proposes relocating the existing
Hurricane Barrier to a new location, south of Fields Point, which would protect the Port
of Providence area. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) constructed
the existing barrier in the 1966 to protect the downtown Providence area (USACE, 2007).
However, the barrier leaves exposed all the maritime infrastructure in the study area, as it
is located seaward of the barrier. The “Protect” concept envisions the construction of a
new barrier and berm system, with a similar design to the Maeslatkering Barrier in the
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Port of Rotterdam, at Fields Point along the southern edge of the study area. The Protect
design concept would span the mouth of Providence Harbor, tying into the existing
elevation in Providence and East Providence. The floodgate could be closed in the event
of a storm, effectively protecting Providence Harbor from forcing associated with
hurricane level storm surge and wave action. When open, the gates would rest on dry
docks on the east and west sides of the harbor entrance. To close the gates the arms
would be floated so that they may swing closed to meet in the center of the channel. A
multipurpose levee located along the shoreline incorporates an earth berm and green wall
along the landside, and a living shoreline along the waterside. A pedestrian/bike path
might run along the top of the levee, and bleachers could be located on a portion of the
landward side for viewing the adjacent sports fields.
Relocate
Relocate (Figure 11), also called “retreat” in climate change literature, reduces the
impact of a storm event by limiting the potential negative effects through moving
structures away from the flood plain (Tol et al., 2008). Historically, relocation has
occurred after an event, when structures are damaged, abandoned, and rebuilt in an area
further from shore or more protected . Relocation may be more appropriate for non-water
dependent uses such as residential housing, as opposed to water dependent coastal
infrastructure. However, in some cases infrastructure such as lighthouses (e.g., Cape
Hatteras Light in North Carolina) have been moved back away from an eroding bluff.
The “Relocate” concept proposed moving some or all of the current industrial uses in
Providence Harbor out of harm’s way. It suggested that other locations around
Narragansett Bay could provide a less exposed area from which to do business, while still
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providing the infrastructure requirements such as access to highway, rail, navigation
channels, pipelines, to operate. The current Exxon Mobil petroleum facility in East
Providence provided an example of such a location, where the berthing facility is located
along the water’s edge but the petroleum product is piped upland and stored in a tank
farm located well away from the floodplain at an elevation of 50 feet

Berth

Terminal

Figure 10 - Example Relocate; Exxon Mobil Berth and Terminal East Providence (Image: Eric Kretsch).
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Appendix 3: Literature related to the definition of adaptation leadership
In this appendix, we will discuss leadership in regards to adaptation and introduce
the concept of “adaptation leadership.” Leadership takes many forms and can be defined
in many ways (Meijerink & Stiller, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, 2011; Stiller &
Meijerink, 2015). However adaptation leaders, defined here as “those that will implement
climate resilience strategies in complex systems such as ports” can be thought to possess
certain behaviors like articulating a vision and stimulating intellectual thought and also
thought to complete specific functions like setting deadlines and locating and allocating
resources (Podsakoff et al., 1990; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015).
Defining leadership
Adaptation leadership can play a key role in navigating adaptation barriers such as
a lack of mandates, resources, information, and authorization to act (Moser & Ekstrom,
2010). Further, a lack of leadership can exacerbate such barriers to action. Adaption
leadership can help to find consensus and make decisions in complex communities with
multiple levels of government in which many stakeholders have multiple adaptation
options (Becker, 2016; Biesbroek et al., 2013; Karlsson et al., 2011; Vogel et al., 2007)
Functions of Adaptation Leadership
To meet the climate change challenge, strong adaptation leadership is expected to
enhance the development and selection of resilience options (Stiller & Meijerink, 2015).
So-called “transformational adaptation”, which are large scale changes that transform
places, like storm barriers or relocating vulnerable infrastructure, may require even
greater input from leadership due to the system-wide issues it presents (Kates et al.,
2012). Research suggests stakeholders at all levels, local to national and including
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business, knowledge institutions, and government officials must communicate to
transform impacted systems (Kates et al., 2012). Leadership can play a major role in
these transformations by providing the ability to maneuver around adaptation barriers
(Meijerink & Stiller, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015).
Adaptation leadership does not always conform to the typical hierarchical forms
of leadership where “an often charismatic, positional leader (someone with a formal
leadership position) succeeds in getting followers for his ideas” (Stiller & Meijerink,
2015, p. 2). Adaptation leadership lies often in organizations or a group of individuals or
organizations and is also transferable from one organization to another (Stiller &
Meijerink, 2015). Such an organization(s) is responsible for fostering transformational
change.
Podaskoff et al. (1990) discusses behaviors of transformational leaders. Since
resilience implementation is a transformational process, we can expect that an adaptation
leader will display six behaviors (Podsakoff et al., 1990), these are:
1. Identifying and articulating a vision – Identifies new opportunities for the future;
presenting to followers and inspiring followers to reach new vision.
2. Providing an appropriate model – Provides a model of behavior and action that
followers can emulate.
3. Fostering the acceptance of group goals – Promotes cooperation among members
of the group in order to motivate the group to work towards group-established
goals.
4. High performance expectations – Expects more from group members than what is
or has been standard practice.

44

5. Providing individualized support – Shows caring and respect for individual
members opinions, struggles, and needs.
6. Intellectual stimulation – Provides an environment that stimulates followers to reevaluate their way of operating and allows for changes in follower behavior.
Leader behaviors enhance follower or actor trust and satisfaction with the process
(Podaskoff et al., 1990). Actors must be satisfied with the process in order to be involved.
Adaptation leader behaviors are only one aspect of adaption leadership; adaptation
leadership facilitates functions that motivate and sustain the policy process. Behaviors
and functions of leaders are important to understand in order to analyze how Port of
Providence actors and leaders perceive leadership roles in the port community.
Stiller and Meijerink (2015) developed a model of adaptation leadership functions
that facilitate the development and implementation of resilience options. Leadership in
this model is not confined to a “top-down” authoritarian structure, often strong leadership
is presented by organizations that allow for the development of new ideas and practices
(Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Leaders create resilience policy by investing human and
financial resources; setting deadlines and establishing an urgency to work; changing the
work environment or operation routines, translating new ideas into policy, and organizing
actors in a stable working group (Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Stiller and Meijerink’s
model consist of five adaptive leadership functions the political-administrative function,
the enabling function, the adaptive function, the dissemination function, and the
connective function. Adaptation leaders by facilitating these five functions to reduce the
impact of barriers to adaptation (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). In other research, we see
examples of the disseminative and connective functions. In Vogel et al. (2007), Tribbia
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and Moser (2008), and Kahan (2010) we see examples of the disseminative and
connective functions and a discussing of discuss various aspects related to these
functions.
Vogel et al. (2007) and Tribbia and Moser (2008) focus on a decision-maker’s
abilities to incorporate science into decision-making. This work clarifies how climate
adaptation knowledge is developed between scientists and policy-practitioners. Vogel et
al. (2007) discusses the “science-practice interface” and the importance of bridging gaps
between scientists and practitioners so that informed decision-making can occur. This
interface previously seen as linear from scientist to practitioner recently is described as
dynamic, where information passes bi- directionally and each group is altered by the
interaction (Vogel et al., 2007).
We see that adaptation leaders provide this the link between science and practice via
the dissemination and connective functions between decision-maker and scientist (Stiller
& Meijerink, 2015; Tribbia & Moser, 2008). Stakeholders can provide localized
knowledge that improves the quality of decisions. (Becker, 2016; Burroughs, 1999;
Messner, Becker, & Adolf, 2016; Preston, Rickards, Fünfgeld, & Keenan, 2015). It is
important to note again that many organizations may be adaptation leaders, because they
facilitate various functions (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015).
Adaptation leaders must possess transformational leadership behaviors and facilitate
various functions in the policy process. These Adaptation leadership behaviors and
functions increase participation, trust, and motivate and sustain resilience
implementation. This results in more optimal resilience outcomes ones that are
politically, economically, and socially feasible. The leaders identified by Port of
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Providence stakeholders may possess the traits of an adaptation leader. This study looks
at how leaders facilitate the functions described in this section.
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Appendix 4: Additional Methods
This appendix provides more information on survey and interview methods
including the analysis of both survey and interview results. We also provide a copy of the
survey used in Part 1 (Appendix 4A) of the study and a script of the interview used in
Part 2 of the study (Appendix 4D).
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Appendix 4A – Copy of Survey
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Appendix 4B - Stakeholder Surveys Analysis
In the survey, respondents were asked to assign responsibility resilience strategy
implementation of the three major concepts to the seven leadership forms. Stakeholders
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answered on a 1 – 5 scale, this included (1) not responsible at all, (2) less responsible
than others, (3) just as responsible as others, (4) more responsible than others, and (5)
entirely responsible. We averaged responses in order to evaluate how the group as a
whole sees the responsibility of each form of leadership.
The lowest average score possible is one; this means that all stakeholders see that
form of leadership as “not responsible at all” for the implementation of the strategy. A
score of three is the mid-point indicating stakeholders see that form of leadership just as
responsible as everyone else. A score less than three indicates stakeholders see that
organization less responsible, with lesser responsibility, as you get closer to one. A score
of greater than 3 indicates that that form of leadership is more responsible than other,
with greater responsibility as you get closer to five. Five is the max score, meaning that
all stakeholders perceive that form of leadership as entirely responsible for the
implementation of the given resilience strategy.
We analyzed open-ended questions by tabulating the number of mentions. We
then used Wordle to develop word clouds. These word clouds are visual representations
of the number of mentions each organization received. The larger the font the greater the
number of mentions. Actual counts are located in the captions of each word cloud image.
We used these word clouds in interviews to show high-level managers efficiently how
stakeholders perceived their organization as well as other organizations.
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Appendix 4C – Copy of Interview Script
Interview Script
Leadership, responsibility, and incentive for long-term resilience planning
Documents needed:
- Study Area Map
- Brief description of Resilience Concepts
- Definition of Implementation and long-term resilience planning
- Word Clouds
Interview Process:
1. Briefly describe study area; explain project to those interviewees that have not
participated in Port Resilience work before, as well as, to those that have been
participating, explain where this interview fits into larger project.
1.1. IMPORTANT: Study area, port focus, explanation of interview purpose.
2. Discussion about long-term resilience planning (what it means), as well as, the
long-term resilience concepts for the Providence Harbor (Relocate,
Accommodate, Protect); define implementation (use same definition from
survey).
2.1. Use of concept descriptions
2.2. IMPORTANT: Long-term resilience planning; concepts; “implementation”
3. Introduction of findings from perceptions survey (word clouds)
3.1. Explain what they are, pass to interviewee to examine and ask questions.
3.2. Explain that these are stakeholder perceptions and do not indicate who
actually should be doing long-term planning.
4. Explanation of anonymity of responses.
5. Begin questions:
5.1. Has your organization taken a lead role in long-term resilience planning at
the Providence Harbor?
5.1.1. What has your organization done?
5.1.2. What role do you see your organization taking at this point?
5.2. “Now that we have gone over these word clouds, you’ll notice that
stakeholders have mentioned X as an organization possibly responsible for
taking a leadership role at the Providence Harbor; do you see your
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organization as having responsibility to take on a leadership role in long-term
planning at the Providence Harbor?
5.3. If yes;
5.3.1. Why has the organization not stepped into this role?
5.3.1.1. Incentives
5.3.2. What would motivate your organization to take on this role?
5.3.2.1. Incentives
5.3.3. Do you perceive any barriers that keep your organization from taking
a leadership role?
5.4. If no;
5.4.1. Why does your organization not perceive itself as responsible for a
leadership position?
5.4.1.1. Barriers
5.4.2. Do you perceive any barriers that keep your organization from taking
a leadership role?
Thank you for meeting with me and have a fantastic day!

Appendix 4D – Leader Interview Analysis
Interviews with representatives of the seven leader organizations ranged from 10
minutes long to 30 minutes long. We recorded these interviews and transcribed them
using Microsoft Word. We printed these transcripts and analyzed the text using colored
pencils in order to identify common themes. During analysis we identified:
•

Perceptions of their organizational responsibility for implementing resilience at
the Port of Providence

•

Perceptions of their organizations role in leading other port stakeholders in
planning and implementing resilience measures

•

Barriers and incentives.

To ensure accuracy of analysis, we selected a random selection of transcription and had
two other researchers from our group analyze the transcripts and identify themes. We
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compared, conversed, and where need adjusted the analysis process and outputs to ensure
consistency.
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Appendix 5: Acronyms used in Word Cloud figures
This appendix shows the acronyms used in the analysis of open-ended questions
asking stakeholder to state specific organizations responsible for resilience implementation.
Table 2 – Acronyms used in Word Cloud figures

CityGov
COTP
FedGov
FEMA
NOAA
PEMA
RICRMC
RIDEM
RIDOT
RIEMA
RIGov
URI
URICRC
USACE
USCBP
USCG
USDHS
USEPA

City Governments (City of Providence; City of East Providence)
Captain of the Port
Federal Government
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Providence Emergency Management Agency
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Council
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management
Rhode Island Department of Transportation
Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency
Rhode Island Government
University of Rhode Island
University of Rhode Island Coastal Resources Center
United States Army Corps of Engineers
United States Customs and Border Patrol
United States Coast Guard
United States Department of Homeland Security
United States Environmental Protection Agency
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Appendix 6: Additional Results
In this appendix, we show additional results collected during the survey. Results augment
the findings outlined in the results section of the main text.
Figures 12, 13, 14, 15 show how survey respondents perceive the responsibility to
lead of the 7 forms of leadership described in Section 3.1 in relation to what resilience
strategy (i.e. resilience in general, protect, relocate, and accommodate) they are
considering.
Figures 16, 17, and 18 show results of the open-ended questions asking survey
respondents to state specific entities responsible for resilience implementation at the port.
The larger font organizations received more mentions.
Appendix 6A – Responsibility to implement Resilience

Average Score

5

Responsibility to implement Resilience (n = 25)

4
3
2
1

Private Business
Private
Independently Businesses in
Collabora:on

All Stakeholder

Public-Private
Informal
Collabora:on

Public-Private
Local Lead
State Lead
Formal
(Providence; (Rhode Island)
Collabora:on East Providence)

Forms of leadership
Public

Federal Lead

Private

Figure 11 - Public-private informal collaboration received an average score of greater than four, the only other
above four is state lead. A score of one indicates “not responsible at all”, two indicates “less responsible”, three
indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates “more responsible than others”, and five indicates “entirely
responsible”.
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Appendix 6B – Responsibility to implement Protect

Average Score

5

Responsibility to implement Protect (n=25)

4
3
2
1

Private Business
Private
Independently Businesses in
Collabora:on

All Stakeholder

Public-Private
Informal
Collabora:on

Public-Private
Local Lead
State Lead
Formal
(Providence; (Rhode Island)
Collabora:on East Providence)

Forms of leadership
Public

Federal Lead

Private

Figure 12 – State lead received the highest average score. A score of one indicates “not responsible at all”, two
indicates “less responsible”, three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates “more responsible than
others”, and five indicates “entirely responsible”.
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Appendix 6C – Responsibility to implement Relocate
Responsibility to implement Relocate (n = 25)
5

Average score

4

3

2

1

Private
Private Business
Independently Businesses in
Collabora:on

All Stakeholder

Public-Private Public-Private
Informal
Formal
Collabora:on Collabora:on

Local Lead
(Providence;
East
Providence)

Forms of leadership
Public

State Lead
(Rhode Island)

Federal Lead

Private

Figure 13 – Overall, all stakeholders only see a State Led form of leadership as responsible to implement Relocate.
However, there is great disagreement between public and private stakeholders. A score of one indicates “not
responsible at all”, two indicates “less responsible”, three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates
“more responsible than others”, and five indicates “entirely responsible”.
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Appendix 6D – Responsibility to implement Accommodate

Responsibility to Implement Accommodate (n = 25)
5

Average Score

4

3

2

1

Private Business
Private
Independently Businesses in
Collabora:on

Public-Private
Informal
Collabora:on

Public-Private
Local Lead
State Lead
Formal
(Providence; (Rhode Island)
Collabora:on East Providence)

Federal Lead

Forms of Leadership
All Stakeholders

Public

Private

Figure 14 - – Public stakeholders tend to see private-centric leadership structures as responsible; while private
stakeholders tend to see public-centric stakeholders as responsible. A score of one indicates “not responsible at all”,
two indicates “less responsible”, three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates “more responsible than
others”, and five indicates “entirely responsible”.
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Appendix 6E – Specific Organizations responsible for Resilience

Figure 15 - # of unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 36; Total Mentions - 83; RICRMC (8), City
Government (7), RIDEM (5), Business (5), RIDOT (5), USACE (4), ProvPort (4), Save the Bay (3), Terminal Operators
(3), RIEMA (3), RI Statewide Planning (3), FEMA (2), USCG (2), Public (2), PEMA (2), USEPA (2), CommerceRI (2),
URICRC (2), RI Governor’s Office (1), USDHS (1), USCBP (1), USDOT (1), University (1), City Planning (1), COTP (1),
Pilots (1), Tugs (1), Providence Working Waterfront (1), QDC (1), Exxon Mobil (1), Sprague (1), Motiva (1), Public –
Private Partnership* (2), Harbor Commission* (1), Port Authority* (1), Non-Profit Collaborative Committee*(1); n
= 25.
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Appendix 6F – Specific organizations responsible for Protect

Figure 16 - # of Unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 21; Total Mentions - 46; RI Government

(8), Federal Government (6), USACE (6), RICRMC (4), RIDEM (4), City Government (3), Public (2), RI
Statewide Planning (1), Collaboration (1), URI (1), CommerceRI (1), ProvPort (1), City Planning (1), Save
the Bay (1), FEMA (1), Private (1), Mass Government (1), RIDOT (1), Business (1), URICRC (1); n = 25.
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Appendix 6G – Specific organizations responsible for Relocate

Figure 17 - # of unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 21; Total mentions - 49; City Government

(8), CommerceRI (5), Business (4), RICRMC (4), None (no organization) (4), Rhode Island Statewide
Planning (3), Federal Government (3), RIDEM (3), RIDOT (2), ProvPort (2), RI Government (2),
Collaboration (1), Courts (1), Public (1), URI (1), Save the Bay (1), City Planning (1), Government (1),
Port of Providence (1), Public-Private Formal Committee * (1), USACE (1); n = 25.
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Appendix 6I – Specific organizations responsible for Accommodate

Figure 18 - # of unique orgs - 24; Total Votes - 45; Business (5), RIDEM (5), Collaboration* (4), RICRMC

(4), City Government (3), RI Statewide Planning (2), EPA (2), USACE (2), FEMA (2), Providence Working
Waterfront (1), URI (1), URICRC (1), RIDOT (1), Federal Government (1), None (1), NOAA (1),
Governor’s Office (1), USCG (1), Public (1), Port of Providence (1), Petroleum Industry (1), Special
Committee* (1), Public-Private Committee* (1); n = 25.
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